I. Introduction
In private equity, the agency relationship between fund managers (the general partners, or GPs) and investors (the limited partners, or LPs) is governed by a management contract signed at the inception of the fund. This contract specifies the compensation of the GPs and the GPs' own investment in the fund. Because private equity involves long-term financial commitments from LPs (funds typically last 10 to 13 years), and because LPs have limited recourse to alternative governance mechanisms, understanding how the incentives provided by these contracts affect fund performance and GP behavior is a critical question in private equity, and is important for our understanding of delegated asset management more generally.
As private equity has grown in prominence, the industry's compensation practices and incentive structures have come under increasing scrutiny by industry observers and limited partners alike. Critics argue that the typical private equity contract allows GPs to earn excessive compensation and does too little to discipline GPs or provide them with incentives to maximize LP returns. For example, Phalippou (2009) argues that the confusing nature of management contracts allows GPs to charge high fees for low average performance. Others have argued that excessive fees dampen managers incentives to deliver good performance. 1 Concerns about such excesses are particularly acute in boom fundraising periods and among large funds. The fact that private equity contractual arrangements and performance are typically shielded from public disclosures not only adds fuel to these claims, but also makes them inherently difficult to evaluate.
In this paper, we use a novel dataset of 837 buyout and venture capital (VC) private equity funds from 1984-2010 to study the relations between contracting terms and performance and cash flow behavior in private equity. The data include information on the fixed management fees and performance-based carried interest that the GP earns as compensation, as well as the GP's own investment in the fund, which determines their ownership stake. The data also contain the complete sequence of cash flows between LPs and GPs, which we use to construct detailed relative performance measures and to examine cash flow behavior directly.
The dataset is the first available in the literature to combine information on management 1 contract terms with fund cash flows.
We begin by offering new descriptive evidence on GP compensation and ownership terms.
This part of our analysis enhances the picture of private equity compensation previously painted in work by Metrick and Yasuda (2010a) and Gompers and Lerner (1999) . The typical fund follows a "2/20/1" rule: 2% management fee, 20% carried interest, and 1% GP ownership. At the same time, there is substantial variation in terms, both in the crosssection and over time. Our results indicate that during boom periods in private equity, when fund sizes grow, overall pay goes up (even as a fraction of fund size) and shifts towards fixed compensation (fees) and away from variable compensation (carry).
By itself, this finding is consistent with the idea that compensation practices in boom periods undermine the incentives of GPs to deliver good performance. Yet, the real question is whether performance suffers as a result of these practices. We find no evidence that funds with higher fixed management fees underperform net of fees. This basic result is robust to a variety of controls and performance measures and is unlikely to be driven by differences in systematic risk. This result also holds true among high-fee funds raised in boom fundraising periods, as well as funds that are both large in size and have high fractional fees.
This result means that, relative to lower fee funds, more expensive private equity funds earn sufficiently higher gross returns to offset their higher fees. This pattern stands in striking contrast to results in the mutual fund literature, which finds a strong negative relation between mutual fund fees and net-of-fee performance (e.g. Carhart, 1997; Fama and French, 2010) , consistent with the relative lack of sophistication of retail mutual fund investors (Berk and van Binsbergen, 2011) .
We find no evidence that funds with low GP ownership underperform, despite concerns that managers of such funds are insufficiently bonded to the fund. In fact, for buyout funds the opposite is true: low-ownership buyout funds outperform. This is consistent with the view that high-ability GPs prefer to diversify their personal portfolios.
Turning to carried interest, despite the limited variation in carried interest in the data, we find some evidence that buyout funds with high carried interest outperform, which is contrary to the view that high carried interest is excessive. On the other hand, we find that high-carry venture capital funds underperform. While this result is weak overall, it grows stronger in fundraising booms and among large VC funds, and suggests that carried interest in VC funds is sometimes excessive.
Overall, the data offer little support for the view that private equity management contracts allow GPs to charge excessive compensation for the performance they deliver or to hold ownership stakes that are too low to provide adequate incentives to deliver good performance. (The exception is the results on VC carried interest.) Instead, the evidence is most consistent with the alternative view that limited partners are relatively sophisticated investors who understand the long-term nature of private equity investments and the limited opportunities for alternative governance mechanisms. Under this alternative view, compensation and ownership terms reflect GP skill, agency concerns, and the demand for GP services over time, with higher compensation justified by greater ability to generate gross-of-fee returns. Further, consistent with a Berk and Green (2004)-type equilibrium, the evidence is consistent with higher-ability GPs largely (but not exclusively) capturing the excess returns they generate. In short, GP compensation and ownership practices in private equity are not so distorted that LP returns are compromised.
Of course, these findings by no means indicate that agency tensions between GPs and LPs do not exist or cannot be observed in the data. Agency conflicts exist largely because GPs possess private information about both the underlying quality of their investments at a particular point in time, as well as their ability to exit the investments over a given timeframe at a particular price. This information asymmetry allows GPs to potentially game the timing of exit decisions to exploit contractual provisions that are designed to protect the LP's return.
Accordingly, in the final part of the paper we investigate the behavior induced by the finer-grained incentives embedded in two such contractual provisions. The typical management contract calls for GPs to first return to LPs all contributed capital (including that for management fees), plus in the case of buyout funds an 8% preferred return, before carried interest is earned. This "waterfall" has the clearly desirable effect, from LPs' perspective, of allowing them to receive "their money back" before GPs earn any profit-sharing. Yet these provisions also create an incentive for the GP to time distributions so that they cluster at and just after the waterfall date. By doing so, the GP earns immediate carried interest on 3 those distributions, and avoids the risk that the investments might later decline in value.
The problem is that this behavior will lead some investments to be harvested too early, when delaying would have generated more value for LPs. Consistent with these concerns, we find that distributions cluster around the waterfall date. Such clustering is difficult to rationalize as an innocuous response to changes in exit opportunities, because there is no reason -other than the GP's particular incentives -why the attractiveness of an exit would spike around waterfall dates.
We find further evidence of the underlying agency problem between LPs and GPs when we examine the impact of the terms upon which GPs earn their management fees on distribution behavior. In about a third of funds, the basis of the management fee shifts to net invested capital (cost basis of all investments less cost basis of realized investments) during the funds life (usually after 4-5 years). While the goal of such a contractual provision is to lower the expenses that LPs pay, it also creates the incentive for GPs to hold on to living dead or zombie investments rather than liquidate them and distribute the (modest) proceeds in order to continue earning management fees on the capital invested. 2 We find evidence consistent with this concern. Funds whose fee basis changes from committed capital to net invested capital are indeed more likely to exit investments later in the funds life.
The findings in this paper contribute to several branches of the literature on private equity and delegated asset management. Our work links the branch of the private equity literature that studies aspects of management contracts with that studying cash flow performance.
The former literature includes Metrick and Yasuda (2010a), Gompers and Lerner (1999) , Our work also adds to the literature studying compensation, ownership, and their link to performance in other delegated asset management settings, notably mutual funds and hedge funds. As noted above, several studies find a negative relation between mutual fund fees and net-of-fee returns. Busse, Goyal, and Wahal (2010) find that institutional investment portfolios come much closer to earning back their fees on average than do mutual funds. Khorana, Servaes, and Wedge (2007) find that mutual fund manager ownership is positively associated with performance. Agrawal, Daniel, and Naik (2009) find that hedge fund managers with stronger incentive compensation and higher ownership earn higher net returns, suggesting that hedge fund managers do not capture excess returns in the form of higher compensation to the same extent that is true in private equity. This paper proceeds as follows. Section II presents the data. Section III studies the determinants of compensation and ownership terms, both across funds and over time. Section IV relates these terms to the cash flow performance of the funds. Section V studies agency issues involving distribution behavior. Section VI concludes.
II. Data and Sample Construction

A. Coverage, Variables, and Sample Selection
Our analysis uses a confidential, proprietary dataset obtained from a large, institutional limited partner with extensive investments in private equity. Table 1 reports that there are 837 buyout and venture capital funds in our sample, representing almost $600 billion in committed capital spanning vintage years 1984-2009. The sample comprises a significant fraction of the documented universe of private equity. We have 34.4% of the Venture Economics (VE) universe of total capital committed to U.S. venture capital and buyout funds, and 55.7% of that committed to U.S. buyout funds, over the same time period. 3 For each fund, the data contain fund-level information on the management fees and carried interest that the GPs earn as compensation, as well as the GPs' own investment (capital commitment) in the fund. The GP's capital commitment determines their direct ownership stake in the fund. The data also contain the complete quarterly cash flows (capital calls and distributions) to and from the funds and their limited partners, as well as quarterly estimated (by the GP) market values of unrealized investments. The cash flows are net of all management fees and carried interest, and comprise over 41,000 time-series observations extending through the second quarter of 2010. We also have data on fund size and on each fund's position in its partnership's sequence of funds (sequence number), and we know whether any two funds belong to the same partnership. 4 The data were anonymized before they were provided to us so we do not know the identity of the GPs or the names of the funds.
The dataset comprises the largest and most recent sample of private equity compensation terms in the literature, and is the first available for academic research to include information on GP ownership. Critically for our purpose, the dataset is also the first to combine cash flow information with compensation and ownership data. Another important advantage of the data is that they come directly from the LP's internal accounting system, and so are free from the reporting and survivorship biases that plague commercially available private equity databases (Harris, Jenkinson, and Stucke, 2010) . The data are also at least partially random: the data provider's overall private equity portfolio was assembled over time through a series of mergers that occurred for reasons unrelated to each company's private equity portfolio.
While our data have many advantages, they do not cover all aspects of the management contracts. In particular, we lack information on the specific carry timing rules for a given fund, and on the split of portfolio company transaction and monitoring fees between GPs and LPs (the latter is relevant only for buyout funds). In principle, this has the potential to create measurement error problems for our analysis. However, as we discuss in Section IV.C, these provisions are likely uncorrelated with the variables we include in our analysis.
Thus, these omitted contractual provisions are unlikely to bias our conclusions. 5 Because our data come from a single (albeit large) limited partner, the representativeness of the sample is a natural concern. Robinson and Sensoy (2011) compare the data to commercially available databases (VE, Preqin, and Cambridge Associates). They note that assessing representativeness is difficult because the universe of private equity funds is unavailable and because commercial databases provide inconsistent accounts of private equity performance (Metrick and Yasuda, 2010b; Harris, Jenkinson, and Stucke, 2010) . In addition, commercial databases include neither compensation/ownership data nor cash flow data, and so are unsuitable for our purpose in any case. Robinson and Sensoy (2011) find no evidence that the performance (IRR) of buyout funds in our sample differs significantly from that reported by commercial databases. Venture capital IRRs in our data are somewhat below what is reported in commercial databases. However, Lerner, Schoar, and Wongsunwai (2007) show that the best-performing VC funds are concentrated among one particular class of LP (endowments), who seem to have superior access to funds. Thus the differences for venture capital likely reflect the GP/LP matching process more than a selection bias per se, with our sample likely representative of funds to which the typical VC investor has access. Moreover, our cross-sectional analyses are only sensitive to selection issues insofar as any potential bias in the data is correlated in specific ways with the explanatory variables. In any case, our results should be interpreted bearing in mind the caveat that we do not have the universe of private equity funds.
B. Summary Statistics on Fund Characteristics
The characteristics of our sample funds are presented in Table 1 We have 542 buyout funds, for a total committed capital of $535.5 billion, representing 55.7% of the total capitalization of the VE U.S. buyout universe. On average, 35% of our funds are first funds. 23% are second funds raised by a firm, and 15% of the funds are third-sequence funds. These numbers are similar to those for the sample used by Kaplan and Schoar (2005) .
The average (median) fund size is $208 million ($106 million) for venture capital funds and $988 million ($313 million) for buyout funds.
Because many of the funds in our sample have recent vintage years and are still active, we 7 also present summary statistics for the sample of funds that were either officially liquidated as of 6/30/2010, or had no cash flow activity for the last six quarters of the sample and had vintage years prior to 2006. This is called the "Liquidated Sample", and has the advantage that performance in this sample is largely based on actual cash flows and not potentially Table 2 provides summary statistics on GP compensation terms (fixed management fees and performance-sensitive carried interest) and on their own capital commitments to the funds they manage, which in turn determine their ownership stakes in the funds. These terms are all contracted at the beginning of a fund's life, and are not renegotiated during the life of the fund. Summary statistics on these terms are useful in their own right because no prior work has had access to data on GP ownership, and because our sample of compensation terms is both larger and more recent than Gompers and Lerner (1999) and Metrick and Yasuda (2010a).
C. Summary Statistics on General Partner Compensation and Ownership
C.1. Management fees
Panel A presents statistics for the full sample, beginning with management fees. For 82 of our 837 funds, management fees are either unknown or are subject to yearly negotiation rather than being specified in advance. We exclude these funds from the fee statistics and analyses, as do Gompers and Lerner (1999) .
In the management contract, management fees are expressed as a fee percentage and a basis to which the percentage applies. As Panel A of Table 2 shows, almost all funds (92%) have an initial fee basis of committed capital (i.e., fund size, which is fixed for the life of the fund). The initial percentage fee (the percentage in effect for the first year of the fund's life) is usually in the range of 1.5% to 2.5%. The average (median) initial fee for VC funds is 2.24% (2.50%), while the figures for buyout funds are lower, at 1.78% for the mean and 2.00% for the median.
The contract frequently stipulates that the fee percentage and/or basis changes at some point during the life of the fund. These changes almost uniformly result in lower management fees later in the fund's life. Panel A of Table 2 shows that 45% of funds see their fee percentage change at least once, while 33% have a change in basis. 6 59% of funds have one type of change or the other (or both), while 18% have both. Venture capital funds are more likely to have the fee percentage change compared to buyout (55% compared to 38% of funds), while the opposite is true for fee basis changes (12% of VC funds have their fee basis change, compared to 41% of buyout funds).
Changing fee percentages and bases imply that it is not sufficient to simply compare management fees across funds solely on the basis of their initial fee percentages and bases.
Instead, to conduct an apples-to-apples comparison, we use the fee basis and percentage information to forecast the expected (at fund inception) dollar management fee for each year of the fund's expected life (assumed to be 10 years for all funds). We then calculate each fund's "lifetime fees", defined as the undiscounted sum of the expected annual fees. We also calculate the present value (at fund inception) of these lifetime fees by discounting each expected annual fee using the 10-year Treasury bond rate in effect at the fund's inception ("PV lifetime fees"). 7 These calculations follow Metrick and Yasuda (2010a) , and details are provided in the Appendix. Table 2 displays summary statistics for lifetime fees and their present value, expressed as a percentage of committed capital. The average (median) lifetime fee is 20.37% (21.38%) of committed capital for VC funds, and 14.49% (14.23%) for buyout funds. The present value of the lifetime fee is on average (median) 16.01% (16.69%) of committed capital for VC funds, and 11.65% (11.52%) for buyout funds. For both types of funds, fixed management fees are a substantial fraction of the total capital committed by LPs. More-over, consistent with the initial fee percentage, buyout fund fees are a significantly smaller percentage of fund size than venture capital fund fees. However, dollar fees are on average higher in buyout funds because of their greater size. Table 2 displays the same summary statistics for the sample of liquidated funds. These statistics are similar to those in Panel A.
Panel A of
Panel B of
Overall, while the median initial fee percentage is indeed 2%, consistent with the "2 and 20" conventional wisdom, there is a substantial amount of variation in management fee terms and expected values, both across and within fund classes.
C.2. Carried Interest
Panel A of Table 2 also shows summary statistics for the carried interest (or carry) of the full sample of funds. The carry specifies the GP's share of the profits earned by the fund.
Consistent with prior work, a carried interest of 20% is the norm, obtained by 89% of VC funds and 97% of buyout funds. 1% of VC funds and 2% of buyout funds have carry below 20%. 10% of VC funds and 1% of buyout funds have carry above 20%. The average carried interest is 20.44% for VC funds and 19.96% for buyout funds. Thus, the median fund in our sample has the conventional wisdom "2 and 20" management fee and carried interest. There is considerably less variation in carried interest than in management fees. What variation does exist is largely in venture funds, and to a lesser extent in buyout funds. This pattern is consistent with Metrick and Yasuda (2010a), though our sample displays some variation across buyout funds while theirs does not. Panel B of Table 2 shows summary statistics for carried interest for the sample of liquidated funds, which are similar to those in Panel A.
C.3. General Partner Ownership
Finally, Panel A of Table 2 shows summary statistics for the capital commitments of the general partners to their funds. The GP's capital commitment determines its ownership stake in the fund, and our data are based on the actual GP commitment.
The median GP capital commitment is 1% of fund size, resulting in a 1% ownership stake. 56% of VC funds and 35% of buyout funds have a GP ownership between 0.99% and 1.01%. The average GP ownership is 1.78% for VC funds and a significantly higher 2.38% for buyout funds. 26% (18%) of VC funds and 43% (23%) of buyout funds have GP ownership stakes above 1.01% (below 0.99%). Though not reported in the table, the fact that buyout funds are substantially larger than VC funds on average causes the difference in GP ownership to be greatly amplified in dollar terms.
Overall, these facts indicate that while it is in some sense standard for general partners to post 1% of total committed capital, a significant fraction of GPs invest smaller or larger stakes in their funds, particularly in buyout funds. Moreover, buyout GPs have higher ownership, in both percentage and dollar terms, than VC GPs. For both types of funds, there is considerably more variation in ownership stakes than in carried interest.
III. The Determinants of General Partner Compensation and Ownership
In this section, we analyze the determinants of general partner management fees, carried interest, and ownership terms. We relate these contractual terms to market conditions and other observable fund characteristics at the time a fund is raised.
Despite the oft-stated concerns about excessive fees in boom periods, no prior work analyzes how compensation terms vary over fundraising cycles. To this end, a key explanatory variable in our analysis is "ln (Industry Flows)", which measures the natural logarithm of the total market-wide committed capital to the fund's asset class (buyout or VC) in the fund's vintage year. In other words, "Industry Flows" is the total fundraising by all funds of the same type and same vintage year as the focal fund. We construct this measure using data from Venture Economics, and not our own sample funds, to capture market-wide fundraising activity.
We employ fund size and sequence number as additional explanatory variables. Gompers and Lerner (1999) , analyzing a sample of venture capital funds raised before 1992, find that larger and older funds have higher carried interest and lower management fees, favoring a learning model of GP compensation rather than a signaling one. Our contribution in this regard to to consider whether these basic patterns continue to hold in more recent times, which in important in view of the huge influx of capital in the industry since 1992, and whether the patterns extend to buyout funds as well as venture funds.
These analyses are reported in Table 3 . In each panel within the table, Columns (1)- (3) consider buyout funds only, and Columns (4)- (6) . Columns (3) and (6) include vintage year fixed effects to emphasize cross-sectional variation holding market conditions fixed.
A. Management Fees
We begin with an analysis of management fees, reported in Panel A of Table 3 . The dependent variable is the present value of lifetime fees as a percentage of fund size. Several patterns emerge.
"PV Lifetime Fees" is strongly increasing in fundraising activity for both VC and buyout funds, consistent with greater GP bargaining power in booms. The coefficients on 'ln (Industry Flows)" imply that a doubling in industry-wide committed capital is associated with a 41%-71% increase in the present value of lifetime fees. Moreover, we know that in boom times fund sizes also increase. 8 Thus, in boom times both fund size and fractional fees increase, so there is a multiplicative, large positive effect on dollar fees.
Larger funds, both buyout and venture, have significantly lower fractional fees in present value terms. These results suggest that high-ability GPs face a fundamental tradeoff between larger fund size and higher fractional fees. 9 Gompers and Lerner (1999) find the same pattern in their sample of VC funds. Not only do their findings hold in the more recent data and extend to buyout funds, but the tradeoff is more pronounced for buyout funds, consistent with scalability arguments advanced by Metrick and Yasuda (2010a) . If the size of venture funds is inherently more limited by the constraints of the investment technology, then venture GPs have less scope to trade off fractional fees in exchange for larger funds.
We also examine variation in the initial management fee percentage and whether the fee basis or percentage changes at some point in the fund's life. These analyses reveal that during fundraising booms, fees become front-loaded early in a fund's life. (For brevity, we do not tabulate these analyses.) Thus, during fundraising booms, fees become front-loaded and increase, even as a percentage of fund size. These results are certainly consistent with skeptical views of GP compensation practices. Table 3 analyzes carried interest. The Panel shows that carried interest is positively related to fund size (and, for VC funds, fund sequence), for both buyout and venture funds. This finding is consistent with Gompers and Lerner's (1999) and Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Vissing-Jorgensen's (2010) findings for VC funds, who show, respectively, that larger venture groups and those with good past performance have higher carry.
B. Carried Interest
Panel B of
Controlling for fund size, carried interest does not move cyclically. Combined with the evidence in Table 3 , these results imply that GP compensation rises and shifts to fixed components during fundraising booms, consistent with greater GP bargaining power during booms and a preference for fixed compensation. 10 Thus, the results suggest that because talented GPs are in scarce supply, capital inflows to private equity result in more favorable GP compensation, even as a fraction of fund size.
The results in Panels A and B of Table 3 also suggest that compensation terms in VC vary with other fund characteristics to a greater extent than is true in buyout funds. This is consistent with scalability arguments whereby size alone can absorb differences in demand for GP services to a greater extent in buyout than is possible in venture.
C. General Partner Ownership
Panel C of Table 3 analyzes GP ownership. Like carried interest, fundraising conditions do not affect GP ownership stakes. There is some evidence that first-time buyout funds (but not VC funds) signal their effort/ability with higher ownership, but the result becomes just short of statistical significance when vintage year fixed effects are included. Thus, the opposing forces that GP bargaining power increases in booms and as they gain experience (which would allow them to negotiate lower ownership), and on the other hand agency concerns grow at the same time (suggesting LPs will prefer higher GP ownership), appear to cancel out in the data.
The the relation between GP ownership and size is positive and concave and buyout funds, consistent with greater agency concerns in larger funds. On the other hand, the relation is negative and convex for VC funds. One explanation consistent with these patterns is that providing incentives through GP ownership is less important in venture than in buyout. This explanation is also consistent with the other facts revealed by our analysis. First, carried interest increases with fund size to a greater extent in VC than in buyout (Panel B of Table   3 ), so that carried interest incentives can more easily substitute for ownership incentives.
Second, and that GP ownership is much higher on average in buyout funds than in VC (Table 2 ). Such considerations are supportive of signaling arguments in the spirit of Leland and Pyle (1977) , which suggest that, because projects that are more distinct from the market have lower signaling costs, GP ownership will be higher in buyout funds because they have less idiosyncratic risk. 11
D. Summary and Discussion
Overall, the results in Table 3 provide novel evidence on the determinants of managerial compensation and ownership in the private equity industry. Times of high fundraising activity are associated with higher fixed management fees but are unrelated to carried interest or GP ownership terms. Thus, during fundraising booms, GP compensation rises and shifts to fixed components, a conclusion that is reinforced by the fact that absolute performance tends to be lower following fundraising booms, leading to lower carry dollars even for a fixed carry percentage. This in turn implies that the elasticities of GP compensation and wealth to fund performance decline during boom times.
The analysis also draws a clear picture of how compensation and incentives vary in the cross-section of funds. Carried interest is higher in larger funds, while management fees are lower. These findings imply that the elasticity of GP compensation to performance is higher in larger funds. The results are consistent with the idea that higher-ability GPs raise larger funds and require stronger incentives, and with a trade-off between size and management fees. In buyout funds, ownership patterns reinforce this conclusion. In VC, lower ownership among larger funds dampens the incentive effects of the higher carried interest.
As discussed in the subsections above, all of these results are potentially consistent with optimal contracting explanations. However, they are potentially consistent with criticisms of private equity compensation and incentives as well. For instance, higher fixed compensation in boom times may result in lower net performance to LPs if contracts are inefficient and GPs are extracting too much. Or, if contracts are efficient, such compensation may simply reflect a higher productivity of GP skills in those times, and the (at least partial) ability of GPs to capture the associated returns, so net performance to LPs need not suffer.
The acid test is therefore how compensation and ownership terms relate to the cash flow performance of the funds. We take up this issue in the next section.
IV. Compensation, Ownership, and Cash Flow Performance
A. Cash Flow Performance Measures
To relate compensation and ownership terms to performance, we would ideally like to form relative performance measures that account for fund-specific loadings on systematic risk factors in returns. Unfortunately, even with cash flow data, obtaining reliable fund-level estimates is extremely difficult in the private equity setting, due to the illiquidity of the funds and the fact that purely objective measures of interim performance are not available (see Korteweg and Sorensen, 2010 , and Driessen, Lin, and Phalippou, 2012, for discussions of the issues involved). Given these constraints, we construct three measures of performance, and further explore the sensitivity of our conclusions to differences in systematic risk in section IV. D. below.
Our first performance measure is the public market equivalent (PME) pioneered by Kaplan and Schoar (2005). The PME is calculated by first discounting all cash distributions and capital calls using the total return of the S&P 500 (from an arbitrary reference date) as the discount rate. The PME is equal to the ratio of the sum of discounted distributions to discounted calls, and measures the lifetime return (net of all fees and carried interest) of the fund relative to that of the S&P 500. By benchmarking returns to public markets, the PME is a major improvement over the IRR, a purely absolute performance measure. At the same time, it is unlikely to be a measure of the true risk-adjusted returns to private equity funds.
Our second measure of performance is a "tailored PME" that is computed in the same way as the regular PME, but using different benchmark indexes (not the S&P 500) depending on the type of fund. For venture funds, we use the Nasdaq composite total return index.
For buyout funds, we group funds according to size terciles and use the corresponding Fama-French size tercile portfolios as the benchmark. 12 In this way, the tailored PMEs help get a closer match compared to the regular PME on variation in systematic risk that is related to the size of private equity portfolio companies, as well as variation that is due to the technology focus of much venture investing.
Our third measure is a "levered PME", that uses a hypothetical levered S&P 500 index as the discount rate in the PME calculation, with the levered index return equal to an assumed β times the actual index return. The levered PMEs thus measure relative performance on the assumption that the fund beta is that which is assumed in the levered index calculation.
While, as noted above, fund-level estimates of β are difficult, the literature has produced industry-level estimates. We use a β of 1.3 for buyout funds and 2.5 for venture capital funds, matching the estimates in Korteweg and Sorensen (2010) . Robinson and Sensoy (2011) provide details on the levered PME calculations and descriptive information on the distribution of PME, tailored PME, and levered PME in the sample.
All three of these measures of fund returns to LPs are net of all management fees and carried interest. Capital calls include fee payments, and distributions are net of carry. On the other hand, if compensation is efficient, then there are two possibilities. If GPs with higher compensation generate higher gross returns and capture them through that higher compensation, we would expect no relation between compensation terms and net performance. If instead some excess returns are shared with LPs, perhaps because competition among LPs is imperfect, then we would expect compensation to be positively related to net performance. Also, if ownership terms are set efficiently, then low GP ownership funds should not underperform. They may even outperform if high-ability managers prefer low ownership stakes (for instance, for diversification of their personal portfolios) and are willing to allow LPs to capture some excess returns in exchange for lower required stakes. Table 4 In both Panels, the first two specifications use the PME as the performance measure, the next two the tailored PME, and the final two the levered PME. Odd-numbered columns focus on buyout funds, even-numbered on venture funds. All specifications include vintage
B. The Cross-Section of Contract Terms and Cash Flow Performance
Panel A of
year fixed effects to focus on cross-sectional variation at a point in time, and standard errors are clustered by vintage year. (We take up the issue of time-series variation in Section IV.
E below.)
There is no evidence that funds with higher management fees have worse net of fee performance, contrary to the inefficiency view. This finding holds across all specifications and in both panels. These results are unlikely due to a lack of power, given the wide variation in performance and lifetime fees, the large sample size, and the fact that significant results do obtain for other variables.
Turning to carried interest, in the full sample (Panel A) buyout fund performance is significantly positively related to carried interest, the exact opposite of the inefficiency view.
This result holds for all three performance measures, and obtains despite the fact that buyout funds display only modest variation in carried interest (cf. Table 1 ). The analogous coefficients in Panel B are just shy of statistical significance. This change is likely due to the smaller sample size; the coefficient actually increases in magnitude compared to Panel A, but the standard error grows.
In the full sample of venture funds, despite the fact that venture funds display more variation in carry than do buyout funds, there is no significant relation between carry and any performance measure, contrary to the inefficiency view. However, in the liquidated sample, VC carried interest is negatively associated with tailored PME and levered PME, suggesting that carried interest in VC funds is sometimes excessive.
Finally, turning to GP ownership, there is no evidence that buyout or venture funds with GP ownership below the modal 1% underperform, contrary to concerns that low GP ownership translates into inadequate incentives to care about performance. Just the opposite is true for buyout funds. The 23% of buyout funds with GP ownership less than 1% outperform by all performance measures, with PMEs about 0.20-0.30 higher than their higher-ownership counterparts. This magnitude is large relative to the sample average PME of 1.18 (Robinson and Sensoy, 2011) , and holds in both the full and liquidated samples. 13 Our conclusions from Table 4 are robust to a number of alternate specifications (unreported for brevity), including by omitting controls for fund size and sequence, entering each contract term individually, and pooling buyout and venture funds and adding an indicator variable for fund type.
Overall, the evidence in Table 4 offers little support for the view that variation in GP compensation and ownership is inefficient. The exception is the specifications relating tailored and levered PMEs to VC carried interest in the liquidated sample.
Instead, the evidence is most consistent with a Berk and Green (2004)-type equilibrium in which compensation and ownership terms reflect agency concerns and the productivity of manager skills. In this view, GPs with higher fees earn their pay by generating higher gross performance, leading to no or a positive relation between compensation and net performance.
Similarly, GPs with lower ownership do not underperform, and in the case of buyout funds generate excess returns that are shared with LPs. These observations are consistent with the view that GP services are the primary scarce resource in private equity (Kaplan and Schoar, 2005 ), while at the same time some excess returns are shared with LPs.
C. Omitted Aspects of Management Contracts
As noted in Section II, our data do not cover two potentially important aspects of GP compensation structures. The first, applicable to buyout funds, is that funds sometimes charge transaction and monitoring fees directly to the portfolio companies they own. The second is that while we have information on the carried interest percentage, we do not know the specific carried interest timing rules, which can make a given percentage more or less valuable to the GP in present value terms (Metrick and Yasuda, 2010a) .
It is therefore important to consider whether these omissions are likely to bias the fee/performance and carry/performance results in Table 4 . First, neither issue induces any error in our performance variables -the distributions we observe are the actual net distributions that the LP earns, and therefore fully reflect these omitted terms. It cannot be the case, therefore, that our performance measures miss important fees that would result in some funds' performance being worse than reported.
The remaining concern is whether omitted contractual features are correlated with the features we observe. Here, the direction of the correlation is important. If funds that charge high management fees also charge high fees to portfolio companies, then the conclusions of Table 4 would be unchanged, since it would continue to be the case that high fee funds earned sufficiently higher gross returns that their net-of-fee returns were not lower than lower fee funds. In this case, it would simply be that our measure of net-of-fee performance would include some unobserved fees that were not included in our present value tabulations in Table 2 .
For the fee/performance results of Table 4 to be overturned, it would have to be the case that unobserved fees were sufficiently negatively correlated with observed management fees that the rank ordering of funds according to fees were reversed, causing our observed low-fee funds to be high-fee funds, and vice versa. In other words, a strong negative correlation between management fees and portfolio company fees would be required for high gross performance to be associated with low fee funds. While we cannot test this directly, our discussions with industry practitioners and experts suggests that this correlation is near zero, and that most of the variation in unobserved portfolio company fees occurs at the vintage-year level, not cross-sectionally within vintage years. Thus, the vintage year fixed effects in Table 4 should absorb most of this variation.
Similar logic applies with respect to omitted carry timing information and the relations between carried interest and performance. To overturn the conclusions of Table 4 of no relation (a positive relation for buyout funds) between carried interest and performance, it must be the case that higher carried interest percentages are accompanied by sufficiently less favorable (to the GP) carried interest timing rules. Here too, our discussions with industry practitioners and experts suggests that most variation in carry timing occurs at the vintageyear level, which is absorbed by the vintage year fixed effects in Table 4 , and there is little correlation between carry timing rules and percentages in the cross-section of funds.
D. Contract Terms and Cash Flow Cyclicality
It is possible that the analyses of the relations between contract terms and performance miss important differences in the systematic riskiness of the funds that are related to contract terms, despite the robustness of the results to tailored and levered PMEs that are designed to partially address this concern. In particular, funds with higher compensation may have higher betas, and this could potentially explain why these funds have higher gross returns relative to public equity benchmarks. Presumably, LPs would prefer for higher compensation and incentives to translate into more effort to add value (i.e., generate alpha), or be more reflective of the ability to do so, as opposed to simply translating into greater systematic risk-taking. These considerations are closely related to the general question in delegated asset management settings of how managerial compensation and incentives impact effort to generate alpha as opposed to loading up on beta.
As noted above in Section IV.B, reliably estimating betas at the fund level is difficult, and no method to do so exists in the literature. However, the behavior of cash flows to and from limited partners allows us to offer some insights into these questions. Holding the magnitude of calls and distributions constant, a fund that is more likely to call capital in 20 bad times and distribute capital in good times will have a higher covariance of cash flow returns with the market return compared to a fund whose call and distribution behavior is unrelated to broader market conditions. 14 Consequently, we can check whether funds with higher compensation or lower ownership are likely to be taking on greater systematic risk by asking whether the comovement of their net cash flows (distributions minus calls) with public market conditions is a function of contractual terms.
The analysis is presented in Table The main explanatory variable of interest is "ln(P/D)", the natural logarithm of the Price/Dividend ratio on the S&P 500 (from Robert Shiller's website), which captures public market valuation levels. We also include the log of Baa-Aaa yield spread (from Datastream), orthogonalized with respect to the log of P/D, to assess sensitivity to debt market conditions unrelated to equity market valuations. We also control for the fund's uncalled capital as a percentage of its committed capital, a measure of a fund's dry powder. All of these explanatory variables are lagged one quarter, so these are predictive regressions. See Robinson and Sensoy (2011) for a discussion of the level coefficients on these variables.
We are interested in how the loadings of net cash flows on these variables, particularly P/D, vary with contract terms. To that end, the first specification in each panel interacts the explanatory variables with the present value of lifetime management fees, the second with the carried interest percentage, and the third with GP percentage ownership. We also include the respective contract terms as explanatory variables themselves. This assures that we account for any differences in the magnitude of cash flows that are associated with the contract terms. In other words, the specifications hold the magnitude of cash flows fixed across the contract terms of interest. 15 The results are easy to summarize. There is no evidence that any contract term is associated with the sensitivity of net cash flows to public equity market valuations (P/D).
In particular, there is no evidence that funds with high management fees or carry, or low GP ownership, display greater cash flow co-movement with public equity markets. Nor is there evidence that such funds have a higher co-movement of cash flows with favorable debt market conditions (in fact for low-GP ownership buyout funds the opposite is true).
Overall, then, the results suggest that it is unlikely that private equity funds with higher compensation earn back their fees by taking more systematic risk. This is true even with respect to the carried interest that one might worry would create systematic risk-taking (as opposed to effort-providing) incentives. Instead, the evidence is more consistent with the interpretation that managers of such funds add more value.
E. Compensation, Ownership, and Performance Over Fundraising Cycles
Concerns about excessive fees, misaligned incentives, and diseconomies of scale are especially acute in boom times, when fund sizes grow and compensation rises, shifts to fixed components, and becomes more front loaded (cf. Table 3 ). In the face of large, certain, and immediate fee income, critics suggest that performance incentives are inadequate. While the cross-sectional tests in Table 4 show that high-compensation or low-ownership funds do not underperform in the cross-section of funds raised at a point in time, those tests do not address whether high-compensation or low-ownership funds raised in boom times underperform. Table 6 takes up this issue, with Panel A focusing on buyout funds and Panel B on venture capital funds. In each panel, the performance measure used as the dependent variable is PME in first three specifications, tailored PME in the next three, and levered PME in the final three. The key explanatory variables are the interactions of contract terms with ln(Industry Flows), which measures market-wide fundraising conditions when the fund is raised. Given 15 Our conclusions are unaffected by instead using indicator variables for whether management fee is above the fund-type specific median, for whether the carry is less than, equal to, or greater than 20%, and for whether GP ownership is less than 0.99%, greater than 1.01%, or in between. Further, while the specifications in Table 5 include all cash flow observations, conclusions are unaffected by restricting the call specifications to observations where the fund has some uncalled capital, and restricting the distribution specifications to observations for which some capital has previously been called. Conclusions are also unaffected by examining calls and distributions separately. this focus, we do not include vintage year fixed effects. In specifications (1), (4), and (7), the contract term is PV Lifetime Fees. In specifications (2), (5) , and (8), it is the carried interest percentage, and in specifications (3), (6) , and (9), it is the GP ownership stake. 16 Panel A shows that high-management fee buyout funds raised in boom times actually outperform, not underperform. The interaction coefficient of 0.01 indicates that a one percentage point increase in PV Lifetime Fees is associated with a one percent increase in PME for every doubling of Industry Flows. This conclusion holds across all three performance measures. At the same time, the levered PME results suggest that high-carry buyout funds raised in boom times underperform, though the result is only marginally significant and not robust to the PME and tailored PME specifications. There is no evidence of an association between buyout performance and the interaction of GP ownership and fundraising cycles.
Turning to venture capital funds in Panel B, there is no evidence of underperformance among high-management fee or low-ownership VC funds raised in boom times. There is, however, robust evidence that high-carry VC funds raised in boom times underperform.
These results add to the evidence in Table 4 suggesting the carried interest in VC funds is sometimes excessive.
F. Compensation, Ownership, and Performance in the Cross-Section of Fund Size
Closely related to concerns about boom-time excesses are concerns about excesses in large funds. Metrick and Yasuda (2010a) find that larger funds have proportionally fewer managing partners tasked with deploying the capital, particularly in the buyout industry, leading to concerns over a combination of misaligned incentives and diseconomies of scale.
As with the boom-time concerns discussed in the previous subsection, a common critique leveled at large private equity funds is that large and certain fee income dilutes performance incentives, especially considering that fee income per partner grows faster than fund size (Metrick and Yasuda, 2010a). 16 In Table 6 , we focus on the full sample of funds because many buyout funds from the most recent boom have not yet liquidated by the end of the sample period. Results are similar in the liquidated sample. Also, in Table 6 , we include the contract terms as continuous (demeaned) variables. Results are similar using instead indicator variables for whether the management fee is above the fund-type specific median, for whether the carry is less than, equal to, or greater than 20%, and for whether GP ownership is less than 0.99%, greater than 1.01%, or in between. Accordingly, Table 7 examines whether large funds, particularly large funds with high compensation or low ownership, underperform. Table 7 is structured in the same way as Table 6 . Here the key interactions are with fund size rather than industry fundraising flows. 17 The results are easily summarized. First, as in previous tables, there is no statistically reliable evidence that larger funds underperform. Nor is there any evidence that large funds with high management fees or low GP ownership underperform.
However, there is evidence that large, high carry funds underperform, for both buyout and venture. At the same time, buyout funds with high carry outperform unconditionally, with a one percentage point increase in carry percentage associated with a 0.05 improvement in PME (representing an extra 5% return over the life of the fund). The interaction between carry and fund size indicates that a doubling of fund size reduces this outperformance by 0.02 PME units. Thus, for buyout funds, these results indicate that unless they are extremely large, high-carry buyout funds do not underperform per se. Rather, large, high-carry buyout funds do not outperform by as much as their smaller, high-carry counterparts.
For venture capital funds, on the other hand, the results are clearly supportive of the message from previous tables that carried interest in venture funds is sometimes excessive.
G. Summary and Discussion
Overall, the evidence in Tables 4-7 provide only very limited support for the view that management contracts in private equity are inefficient. The main evidence in favor of this view is the fact that high-carry venture capital funds underperform. While this result is weak in the overall cross-section, it grows stronger in fundraising booms and among large VC funds.
For the most part, however, GP compensation and ownership is unrelated to the funds' cash flow performance, and most significant relations oppose the inefficiency view. High-carry and low-GP ownership buyout funds outperform, the opposite of the inefficiency prediction.
Further, there is no evidence for the common critique that large, certain, and immediate 17 As in Table 6 , Table 7 focuses on the full sample of funds and includes the contract terms as continuous (demeaned) variables. As before, results are similar in the liquidated sample or when using instead indicator variables for whether the management fee is above the fund-type specific median, for whether the carry is less than, equal to, or greater than 20%, and for whether GP ownership is less than 0.99%, greater than 1.01%, or in between. fee income reduces performance. High-management fee funds do not underperform in the overall cross-section, nor in boom times, nor among large funds.
The evidence is most consistent with the view that management contracts in private equity are more or less efficient, whereby variation in compensation and ownership reflects variation in GP skill, agency concerns, and the demand for GP services. The evidence is broadly consistent with a Berk and Green (2004)-type equilibrium in which GPs largely capture the excess returns they generate.
V. Compensation Incentives and Cash Flow Behavior
The evidence thus far indicates that, on average, compensation practices in private equity are not so distorted that LP returns are compromised. This does not mean, however, that agency tensions between GPs and LPs cannot be observed in the data. Agency conflicts exist largely because GPs possess private information about both the underlying quality of their investments at a particular point in time, as well as their ability to exit the investments over a given time-frame at a particular price. This information asymmetry allows GPs to potentially game the timing of their exits to take advantage of contractual provisions that alter the GP's payoffs in a way that is designed to protect the LP's return.
In this section, we investigate two such issues that are frequently cited by practitioners and in the popular press. We first examine the clustering of distributions around "waterfall" dates for earning carried interest, and then turn to the question of "zombie funds", whereby funds with management fees based on net invested capital have incentives to delay distributions on "living dead" investments to continue earning management fees on those investments. As we will see, the evidence supports both of these concerns.
A. Distribution Clustering around Carried Interest Waterfalls
The first issue concerns the timing of distributions around the threshold for earning carried interest. In general, GPs earn no carried interest until a certain basis (usually, contributed capital to date) plus a preferred (hurdle) return is first distributed to LPs. While it is clearly desirable for LPs that they receive "their money back" before GPs earn any profit-sharing, a potential, and less desirable, side-effect concerns the behavior of GPs once this "waterfall" for earning carried interest is crossed. Specifically, practitioners emphasize the incentive for the GP to time distributions so that they cluster at and just after the waterfall date. By doing so, the GP earns immediate carried interest on those distributions, and avoids the risk that the investments might later decline in value. The problem is that this behavior will lead some investments to be harvested too early, when delaying would have generated more value for LPs. 18 One practitioner characterized these incentives to us as: "Once you reach the waterfall, it's time to turn on the vacuum cleaner". Despite anecdotal accounts, there exists no systematic evidence on whether GPs in fact behave this way.
While we cannot observe the counterfactual of what would happen to performance if GPs held investments for longer or shorter than they actually do, we can test for whether distributions cluster around the waterfall date. Such clustering would be difficult to rationalize as an innocuous response to changes in exit opportunities, because there is no reason -other than the GP's particular incentives -why the attractiveness of an exit would spike around waterfall dates.
As discussed in Section IV.C, we do not know the specific carry timing rules for our sample funds. Therefore, we examine distribution behavior around waterfall dates implied by what Metrick and Yasuda (2010a) report is, by a considerable margin, the most common carried interest timing scheme. In this scheme, GPs begin to earn carried interest (the waterfall occurs) once the LPs receive back, in the form of distributions from exited investments, all of the capital they had previously contributed to the fund (including both capital contributed for investments and management fees paid), plus a preferred return. In buyout, this preferred return is almost always 8% annualized, while venture contracts rarely have a preferred return, so the threshold is simply the return of contributed capital. To the extent that some sample funds employ different carry timing rules, the resulting noise in our estimates of when the waterfall occurs biases the tests against finding an effect. Table 8 presents If funds cluster distributions around the waterfall, we expect a positive and significant coefficient on the waterfall quarter indicator, indicating higher distributions in that quarter relative to the four prior quarters. We also expect distributions to be higher compared to the pre-waterfall period in the 1-4 quarters after the waterfall quarter, and for this to decline subsequently (in the period 5-8 quarters after the waterfall). That is, we expect a hump-shaped pattern of distributions, with a peak around the waterfall date.
The evidence in Table 8 strongly supports agency concerns that funds cluster distributions around the waterfall date. In column (1), we see that distributions in the waterfall quarter are 47.72% of fund size higher on average than the average quarterly distribution in the four pre-waterfall quarter. 19 In the period 1-4 quarters after the waterfall is met, distributions are on average 3.25% of fund size larger than the average for the four pre-waterfall quarters.
In the period 5-8 quarters after the waterfall is met, distributions are on average 2.97% of fund size smaller than the average for the four pre-waterfall quarters.
Of course, one concern is that the large distributions in the waterfall quarter may simply be an artifact of the best-performing funds, whose distributions are larger on average. To address this concern, Column (2) includes a control for the fund's total distributions over its life, and Column (3) includes fund fixed effects to focus purely on time-series variation 19 Unlike capital calls, distributions are not capped at 100% of fund size.
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in distributions within a fund. The results are robust. Further, Columns (4)-(9) repeat the analysis for buyout and venture capital funds separately. The general patterns hold for both types of funds, though the coefficient on the period 1-4 quarters after the waterfall is not significant (though still positive) for buyout funds.
B. Zombie Funds and Living Dead Investments
The second issue concerns the incentive for funds to delay liquidating poorly performing "living dead" investments. This can result in so-called "zombie funds" who hold ongoing investments with little hope of a profitable exit. These incentives arise when the fund's management fee basis changes to be based on net invested capital (total equity investments minus the cost basis of realized, exited investments) at some point in the fund's life. The intent of such rules is for LPs to avoid paying GPs management fees on investments they are no longer managing. Clearly, this is good from the LP's perspective, and our data show that lifetime management fees are indeed lower among such funds. At the same time, such rules mean that exiting unprofitable investments and returning the modest proceeds to LPs will reduce the base of capital on which the GPs earn management fees, giving them the incentive to delay doing so. While this issue has received particular attention among private equity critics 20 , there is no systematic evidence on whether GPs actually behave this way.
Because we do not have information on underlying portfolio companies, we do not know whether any given distribution in the data is associated with a profitable or an unprofitable investment. However, we can test whether funds that have this kind of management fee basis shift do in fact tend to have distributions later in life compared to funds without such management fee provisions. Such a finding would be consistent with "zombie fund" concerns. year fixed effects to control for market-wide factors that might influence the size and timing of distributions (for example, the existence of favorable IPO markets for exiting investments) in the cross-section of funds.
The key explanatory variable is an indicator for whether the fund in question has a fee basis change that gives rise to "zombie fund" concerns, interacted with (the natural logarithm of) the age of the fund, measured in calendar quarters. A positive coefficient on this variable indicates that distributions occur later in life for funds with such a management fee basis change, consistent with the concerns outlined above. Table 9 focus on all funds pooled together. Column 
Columns (1)-(3) of both panels of
VI. Conclusion
We use a large, proprietary database of private equity funds to study the links between the terms of private equity management contracts and the subsequent cash flow behavior and performance of the funds. The database is the largest and most recent source of private equity compensation terms available to date, and is the first to provide information on manager ownership and to include cash flow information along with the terms of management contract.
We use these data to contrast two views of the state of managerial compensation practices 29 in private equity. The first is that highly compensated GPs, or those with little skin in the game, extract excessive rents and have inadequate incentives, which ultimately spells poor returns for limited partners. The second view is that the management contracts we observe reflect (potentially constrained) efficient bargaining outcomes between sophisticated parties, and that management contracts reflect the productivity of GP skills and the agency problems that LP's face.
The evidence in this paper supports the latter view. To be sure, during fundraising booms, percentage management fees increase and GP's compensation shifts toward the fixed component, consistent with greater GP bargaining power and a preference for fixed compensation. Moreover, GPs who receive fees on invested capital tend to exit investments (and thus lower their fee basis) more slowly, while GPs tend to accelerate the pace of exit immediately after they become eligible to receive carried interest. These findings indeed suggest that the fundamental information asymmetry between GPs and LPs allows GPs to game the contractual provisions that are partially in place to protect the LP's return, and they certainly illustrate that GP's earn more in boom periods. However, we find no evidence that high-fee funds underperform an on a net-of-fee basis. Management fees and carried interest are generally unrelated to net-of-fee cash flow performance. This suggests that private equity GPs that receive higher compensation earn it in the form of higher gross returns. When we examine the relation between GP ownership and performance, our evidence flatly contradicts the argument that GPs with low skin in the game demonstrate poor performance.
Thus, even though the asymmetric information problem between LPs and GPs may sometimes give rise to a misalignment of incentives between GPs and LPs in private equity, the management contracts that facilitate investment in the private equity industry are not so bad at providing incentives (or so confusing) that these conflicts lead LPs to suffer low returns on average. The fact that GP compensation goes up in boom periods does not mean that they capture an undue proportion of the rents from private equity investing; instead it means that the overall rents on average increase during private equity booms. The fact that contractual provisions designed to protect LP returns are subject to gaming by GPs does not mean that LPs are any the worse for having them; it simply reflects the fact that, in equilibrium, such contractual provisions come with costs as well as benefits.
Our results on the relation between fees and net-of-fee performance in private equity stand in marked contrast to what is known about the mutual fund industry. There, net-offee performance is strongly negatively correlated with management fees. Of course, limited partners who invest in private equity are different from mutual fund investors in a number of important respects. First, because they are typically large institutions committing large sums of capital, they presumably are more sophisticated than most retail investors. But perhaps more importantly, the inability to withdraw their commitments without incurring substantial costs creates much stronger incentives to screen GPs ex ante and to guarantee that management contracts optimally reflect their agency concerns. In this regard, private equity investors also differ from investors in hedge funds, who are able to withdraw their capital periodically, with advance notice given to the fund. Our results suggest that understanding how monitoring, oversight and the matching process between LPs and GPs affect the equilibrium effort and performance of intermediated capital is an important question for future research. 31 
Appendix
In this Appendix we describe the calculation of lifetime management fees and their present value. For the 454 sample funds (60.1%) whose fee basis is committed capital and never changes throughout the life the of the fund, these calculations are straightforward. Expected dollar management fees for each year are obtained by applying the fee percentage in effect
for that year to the fund's committed capital (in 257 of these 454 funds, the fee percentage is constant over time as well).
For the 8% of funds whose initial fee basis is not committed capital, and the 33% of funds whose basis changes at some point, assumptions are needed to calculate expected fees for years in which the basis is not committed capital. Following Metrick and Yasuda (2010a), we assume that capital calls for investments are expected to be made over the first 5 years of a fund's life. For VC funds, the expected investment pace is 39%, 18%, 15%, 16%, and 12% in years one through five, respectively. For buyout funds, it is 22%, 22%, 20%, 19%, and 17%. These expected investment paces are equal to the actual empirical size-weighted average investment paces for our sample funds (based on our cash flow data) -Metrick and Yasuda (2010a) use similar investment paces derived from a different sample of funds. Again following Metrick and Yasuda (2010a), we assume that investments are exited following an exponential distribution with parameter 0.2 (corresponding to an average five year holding period).
Using these assumptions, we forecast the expected invested capital (total equity capital invested in portfolio companies to date) and net invested capital (invested capital minus the cost basis of realized investments) for each year. Together with committed capital, these are the most common fee bases. Further, the most common basis changes are from committed capital to net invested capital or (less frequently) invested capital. In a few rare cases, the initial or later fee basis is "net asset value" rather than committed capital, invested capital, or net invested capital. In these cases we assume that investments are valued at cost, which results in an effective basis of net invested capital. In a few other rare cases, the initial or new fee basis is committed capital less the cost basis of realized investments. We forecast this basis and compute expected fees in these cases using the same investment and exit 32 assumptions laid out above.
With these forecasts, we then obtain expected annual management fees by applying the percentage fee for each year to the applicable forecasted fee basis for that year (reflecting changes in fees and bases when they are scheduled to occur). Lifetime fees and their present value then follow immediately. Metrick Panel A contains summary statistics on management fees, carried interest and GP ownership (capital commitments) for the full sample of 837 funds. The initial fee percentage is the annual percent management fee at the fund's inception (i.e., the percentage fee for the first year of the fund's life); the initial fee basis is the basis to which this percentage is applied. Fee % Changes and Fee Basis Changes are indicator variables for whether the initial fee percentage or basis ever change over the fund's life. Lifetime fees is the total expected management fees earned over the life of the fund (see Appendix for calculation details). PV Lifetime fee is the present value of the lifetime fees discounted by the 10-year Treasury rate in effect at the end of the fund's vintage year. Management fee information is available for 755 of the 837 sample funds, and 491 of the 560 liquidated funds. Carried interest is the GP's profit participation. The GP ownership is the GP's commitment of its own capital to the fund, above and beyond the profit claim from carried interest. Panel B contains the same information for the sample of liquidated funds. This table presents cross-sectional fund-level OLS estimates of the relations between final fund performance, net of all management fees and carried interest, and the terms of the fund management contract. In specifications (1)-(2), the dependent variable is the fund's final PME with respect to the S&P 500 ("PME"). In specifications (3)-(4), the dependent variable is the fund's final PME with respect to its tailored index ("Tailored PME"). The tailored index is the Nasdaq for VC funds, and the Fama-French small, medium, and large size-tercile portfolios for small, medium, and large buyout funds, respectively. In specifications (5)- (6) , the dependent variables is the fund's "levered PME", as defined in Robinson and Sensoy (2011) . The levered PME adjusts the PME calculation to allow for a beta not equal to one. We use a beta of 1.3 for buyout funds and 2.5 for VC funds, consistent with recent estimates in the literature. "GP Ownership High" and "GP Ownership Low" are indicator variables for whether the GP commitment is greater than 1.01% of fund size or less than 0.99% of fund size, respectively. All other variables are defined in previous tables. PV Lifetime Fees is dummied out for funds without management fee information or without pre-specified fees. This table presents estimates of the sensitivities of fund-level net cash flows to broader market conditions, as a function of the fund's compensation and ownership terms. The dependent variable is a fund's net cash flows (capital distributions minus calls) in a calendar quarter, as a percentage of fund size. The unit of observation is a fund-calendar quarter. Cash flows are between the funds and their limited partners, and are net of all management fees and carried interest. P/D is the price/dividend ratio of the S&P 500, Yield Spread is the Baa-Aaa yield spread, and % Uncalled is the percentage of the fund's committed capital that has not been called, all measured at the end of the preceding calendar quarter. ln(Yield Spread) is orthogonalized with respect to ln(P/D). In specification (1), the contract term analyzed is the present value of lifetime fees (as a percentage of fund size). In specification (2), the contract term is the carried interest percentage, and in specification (3) (6), it is the fund's final Tailored PME; in columns (7)-(9), it is the fund's final Levered PME. In specifications (1), (4), and (7), the contract term analyzed is the present value of lifetime fees (as a percentage of fund size). In specifications (2), (5) , and (8), the contract term is the carried interest percentage. In specifications (3), (6), it is the fund's final Tailored PME; in columns (7)-(9), it is the fund's final Levered PME. In specifications (1), (4), and (7), the contract term analyzed is the present value of lifetime fees (as a percentage of fund size). In specifications (2), (5) , and (8), the contract term is the carried interest percentage. In specifications (3) This table presents estimates of whether funds cluster distributions to occur just after the threshold for earning carried interest has been crossed (the "waterfall"). The threshold is calculated using the rule that all called capital, plus a hurdle rate of return, must be returned to LPs before carry is earned. For buyout, the hurdle rate is 8%. For venture capital, there is no hurdle return. Metrick and Yasuda (2010a) document that this is by a considerable margin the most common carried interest scheme employed by private equity funds in practice. The dependent variable is a fund's quarterly distribution to LPs, as a percentage of fund size (committed capital). The unit of observation is a fund-calendar quarter. The independent variables are indicator variables for (i) whether the fund-quarter in question is the quarter in which the waterfall is achieved ("Waterfall Quarter"), (ii) whether the fund-quarter in question lies in the four quarters after the waterfall is achieved ("1-4 Quarters After Waterfall"), and (iii) whether the fund-quarter lies in the four quarters after that ("5-8 Quarters After Waterfall"). "Total Dists" is the total amount of distributions (as a percentage of fund size) made by the fund over its life. Regressions are run only for funds that achieve the waterfall at some point in their lives, and only for fund-quarters beginning four quarters before the waterfall quarter and ending eight quarters after the waterfall quarter (the interval [-4,+8] quarters around the waterfall quarter). Thus, the coefficients on the indicator variables measure the difference between average distributions in each corresponding time period and average distributions in the four quarters prior to the waterfall quarter (the omitted category). The omitted category estimate is the fund fixed effect in specifications in which they are included, and the constant term in specifications that do not include fund fixed effects. These variables are estimated but not reported for brevity. Estimation is OLS for ease in interpreting coefficients. Tobit results accounting for left-censoring at zero are similar. Specifications (1)-(3) include all funds, specifications (4)-(6) include only buyout funds, and specifications (7) This table presents estimates of whether distributions occur later in life among funds whose management fee basis shifts to net invested capital (cost basis of all investments less cost basis of realized investments) during the fund's life (usually after 4-5 years). It is frequently alleged that such fee structures give GPs an incentive to hold on to "living dead" or "zombie" investments rather than liquidate them and distribute the (modest) proceeds, so that they continue to earn management fees on the capital invested. "Fee Basis Changes" is an indicator variable equal to one if the fund's fee basis changes from committed capital to net invested capital after the investment period (4-5 years of life), and zero otherwise. "ln (Fund Age)" is the natural logarithm of the fund's age in calendar quarters. "Total Dists." is the total distributions to LPs made by the fund over the course of its life (as a percentage of fund size). "PME" is the fund's final PME at the end of its life. "Number Dists." is the total number of calendar quarters in which the fund made a distribution over its life. The unit of observation is a fund-calendar quarter. In Panel A, the dependent variable is a fund's quarterly distribution to LPs, as a percentage of fund size (committed capital). In Panel B, the dependent variable is an indicator variable for whether the fund made a distribution to LPs in the focal calendar quarter. Estimation is OLS for ease in interpreting the coefficients. Tobit (Panel A) and probit (Panel B) estimation yields similar results. Specifications (1)-(3) include all funds, specifications (4)-(6) include only buyout funds, and specifications (7)-(9) include only venture capital funds. Specifications (3), (6), and (9) include fund fixed effects. A constant is estimated in each specification but not reported for brevity. All specifications include vintage year fixed effects. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered by fund. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
